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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INTERPLEADER IN NEW YORK-JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM
Interpleader' is an effective tool in preventing multiple litigation and mul-
tiple liability, generally, but where the dispute arises over a debt, and one or
more of the claimants are nonresidents of the state in which the suit is initiated,
serious jurisdictional difficulties arise. While federal interpleader comes to a partial
solution, it falls short of completely satisfying the needs of banks and surety com-
panies because of the five hundred dollar minimum limit on the amount in con-
troversy and diversity of citizenship restrictions. 2 State courts, on the other hand,
are inhibited by the traditional notion of a debt as being a personal relationship
between creditor and obligor of such intangibility as to prevent a debtor from
interpleading the creditor-claimant by serving him by publication.3
Besides providing a short term statute of limitations applicable to such situ-
ations,4 and providing for an interstate interpleader compact,3 New York en-
acted in 1954 a jurisdictional provision in its interpleader statute intended to
remedy the situation outlined above." Section 286 of the Civil Practice Act now
provides that a stakeholder entitled to interplead for money, provided he is a
domiciliary or a firm doing business within the state, may apply for an order per-
mitting him to pay money into court and serve nonresident claimants by publica-
tion as provided by the concurrently enacted subdivision four of section 232.7
1. Interpleader is a procedure by which A can bring C and D into one action
to determine which of them is entitled to the property or fund. A can originate
an action against C or D or, if he has been sued by C, he may bring D into that
suit. 5 CARmODY-WArr, CYcLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 187 (1953).
2. 62 STAT. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1335 (1953). The constitutionality of this
statute was upheld in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). While
the statute merely requires two or more adverse claimants to be of diverse
citizenship, the nature and degree of adversity required is still somewhat uncer-
tain. See Haynes'v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957).
3. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Hanna v.
Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921); Mechanics & Travelers Insurance
Co. v. McVay, 142 Ark. 522, 219 S.W. 34 (1920); Palmer v. Bank of Sturgeon,
281 Mo. 72, 218 S.W. 873 (1920); Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa
739, 241 N.W. 700 (1932).
4. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. §51-a. The case of Solicitor for the affairs of His
Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., 304 N.Y. 282, 107 N.E.2d 448 (1952) has
substantially limited the effectiveness of this section.
5. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 775. See Zimmerman, Wendell, Heller, Effective
Interpleader via Interstate Compacts, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1955).
6. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, c. 561.
7. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §286(2) provides:
Where a stakeholder is otherwise entitled to proceed, under
section two hundred and eighty-five for the determination of
a right to, interest in, or lien upon, a sum of money, whether
or not liquidated in amount, payable in the state under or on
account of a contract, express or implied, or claimed as
damages for the alleged unlawful retention of specific real or
personal property within the state, and the stakeholder is a
natural person having a permanent residence or an estab-
lished place of business in the state or subject to service of
process within the state, he may apply to the court either
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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The Judicial Council extended a caveat about the future of the statute,8 but
thought that the trend in the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
indicated an expansion of the in rem and quasi in rem concepts. In the apparent
absence of litigation involving the statute since its enactment, and in view of
recent developments in other areas of the law relating to the prospective in rem
treatment of a debt, some interesting questions are raised in respect to section 286.
Fundamental to any discussion involving jurisdiction is the proposition that
the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.9 This power may be asserted
over persons by personal service of process, or over things by an action directed
against the thing with notice to "all the world" by publication. While the dis-
tinction between in rem and quasi in rem actions is seldom identified in recent
cases, the latter is a means of creating jurisdiction over an absent owner of pro-
perty within the state in order to adjudicate personal rights and obligations by
proceeding against the proper6y.10 Otherwise it is necessary that the individual
whose rights may be affected be physically present with the state, domiciled there-
in, even though temporarily absent, 1 or he must have consented, actually or con-
structively, to the exercise of jurisdiction over him.' 2
A judgment of a court purporting to adjudicate a personal claim or obliga-
tion of an absent defendant without acquiring jurisdiction over his person is not
entitled to full faith and credit by constitutional mandate in another jurisdiction,"3
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
before the action or at any time during the pendency of an
action commenced against such stakeholder, upon good cause
shown, for an order permitting him to deliver or pay into the
court or to a person designated by the court to retain to the
credit of the action said sum of money or part thereof to
be disposed of in accordance with further order or finaljudgment. The court shall make such order upon satisfactory
proof by affidavit or otherwise of the facts alleged in the
stakeholder's application regarding stakeholder's compliance
with the requirements of this subdivision.
Upon compliance with the order of the court, such sum
of money shall be deemed to be property within the state
for the purposes of this subdivision and subdivision four of
section two hundred thirty-two.
8. "However, the only way to ascertain whether such a concept or statute
is constitutional is by litigation resulting in a determination by the Supreme
Court of the United States." TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, 1954, p. 284.
9. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), per Holmes, J.:
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although
in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that power
throughout proceedings properly begun .... No doubt there
may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdic-
tion beyond service or appearance but the foundation
should be borne in mind.
10. Pennoyer v. Neff,*95 U.S. 714 (1877).
11. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
12. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
13. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S.
178 (1901); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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and where such a judgment would not be honored, and the possibility of double
liability exists, it would not be due process of law.14 A judgment against an in-
dividual without establishing those minimum contacts which amount to juris-
dictional co trol, is not due process. 15
These concepts, it must be noted, are more readily applicable to tangibles
and relationships of individuals with property that can be said to be "located"
or have its "sims" within certain spatial limitations within the state. It is in-
teresting to note that at very early common law the writ in debt was a praecipe
quod reddat (command that he render) in the same manner as writs for the
recovery of land.'6 In other words, as in the case of real actions, the defendant
was conceived of as having in his possession something belonging to the plain-
tiff which he might not rightfully keep, but ought to surrender. Thus the re-
quirement that the obligations of the debtor be always in a definite sum of money
or a fixed quantity of chattels.17 Such is not the law today. A debt is a relation-
ship between the parties, at once a right of the creditor and an obligation of the
debtor' 8 but the confusion surrounding the persistent efforts to ascribe such a
situs to a debt as to allow an action in rem is well out of proportion to the seem-
ingly elementary nature of the subject. An outstanding example is the line of
cases which terminated near the beginning of this century, concerning garnishment.
Basically garnishment is a form of attachment in which the property attached
is not in the hands of the debtor but is with a third person. The question is,
are wages owing to an employee, or is a bank account at the call of an out-of-state
depositor, such property that may be attached and used to constitute a res so as to
justify service by publication upon the absent creditor? In London, where the
custom of garnishment originated, a debt could be attached if it were due in Lon-
don and the garnishee were a citizen of that city.19 The colonies accepted this
custom as part of the common law but in the evolution of the cases, the require-
ment of place of payment, with the exception of one early case,20 appears to have
been forgotten,2 1 and a hopeless conflict developed as to whether the debt could
be reached at the location of the debtor or creditor, in the absence of one or the
14. Mahr v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society, 127 N.Y. 452, 28 N.E.
391 (1873); Ward v. Boyce, 152 N.Y. 191, 46 N.E. 180 (1897).
15. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Baker v. Baker, Eccles
and Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917). •
16. AmES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 88 (1913).
17. See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 205 (1895);
3 HOLDSWoRTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 421 (3d ed. 1927).
18. Ward v. Boyce, supra note 14.
19. Mayor of London v. Cox, L.R. 2 H.L. 239 (1867).
20. Tingley v. Bateman, 10 Mass. 343 (1813).
21. See King v. Cross, 175 U.S. 396 (1899); Molyneux v. Saymour, 30 Ga. 440
(1860); Rothschild v. Knight, 176 Mass. 48, 57 N.E. 377 (1900).
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other at the place of suit.2 2 Finally the Supreme Court, in Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railway v. Sttrm,23 decided in favor of the former, in allowing a
Missouri garnishment to be used as a defense by the garnishee against his prin-
cipal debtor, who was served by publication in the first action, wljn sued on
the debt in Kansas. Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court, there conceived
of the right of the creditor and the obligation of the debtor as each having an
individual quality of a res, which would seem rather unrealistic since the reciprocal
relationship of the debtor and creditor will allow for no such separation. How-
ever the Court in Harris v. Balk,2 4 finally crystallized interstate garnishment by
holding that a debt may be attached wherever the garnishee can be served, re-
gardless of domicile if the primary obligor could have sued his debtor in that
jurisdiction.25
Following the explicit reasoning of these cases, it would seem to have been
a short step to allow constructive service upon a claimant to a debt in an action in
interpleader, since the rights of the principal debtor in garnishment were deter-
mined on that basis. But such was not to be the case. In 1910 one Mrs. Dunlevy
owed a debt to Boggs & Buhl, who instituted a garnishment proceeding in Penn-
sylvania against the New York Life Insurance Company claiming it owed a debt
to Mrs. Dunlevy, now in California, arising out of an assignment by Gould to her.
Thereupon the insurance company paid the amount of money in dispute into
court and interpleaded Boggs & Buhl, Gould and Mrs. Dunlevy, serving the latter
out of state. Meanwhile Mrs. Dunlevy obtained a judgment against the insurance
company in her favor in California, having obtained personal service of process
over all the necessary parties. The Supreme Court 20 held the conflicting Pennsyl-
vania judgment, for Boggs & Buhl, void, saying:
Beyond doubt without the necessity of further personal service of process
upon Mrs. Dunlevy, the court of common pleas at Pittsburgh had ample
22. At the domicil of the creditor: State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15
Wall. 300 (U.S. 1872); Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882); Louisville &
Nashville N.R.R., 118 Ala. 477, 23 So. 825 (1898). At the domicil of the debtor:
Burlington & M.R. Co. v. Thompson, 31 Kan. 180, 1 Pac. 622 (1884); Morgan v.
Neville, 74 Pa. 52 (1873); Glover v. Wells, 40 Ill. App. 350 (1891), aff'd, 140 Ill. 102,
29 N.E. 680 (1892); Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wise. 488, 55 N.W. 919 (1893).
23. 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
24. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
25. See Holt, The Federal Interpleader Act and Conflict of Laws in Garnish-
ment, 4 U. Cm. L. REV. 403 (1937) for a discussion of the problems created by
this-doctrine where there are simultaneous garnishments in different jurisdictions.
Until recently New York apparently continued to follow the pre-Harris
decision of Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 N.Y. 209, 33 N.E. 938 (1893), which
held the situs of a debt for purposes of garnishment to be at the domicil of the
debtor. See Salim v. Krieg, 182 Misc. 721, 49 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Kennedy,. Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York, 35 Y= L. J. 689 (1926).
Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510 (1946),
however, gave full effect to section 916 of the Civil Practice Act in a situation
analogous to that in Harris v. Balk.
26. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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power through garnishment proceedings to inquire whether she held a
valid claim against the insurance company, and, if found to exist, then to
condemn and appropriate it so far as necessary to discharge the original
judgment. Although herself outside the limits of the state, such dis-
position of the property would have been binding on her.... But the
interpleader initiated by the company was an altogether different mat-
ter. This was an attempt to bring about a final and conclusive ad-
judication of her personal rights, not merely to discover property and
apply it to debts.2 7
The line here drawn between garnishment and interpleader may be one
without a difference since in Harris the property sought to be discovered was
itself nothing more than a debt and therefore an adjudication of the principal
debtor's right to recover in apparently the same degree as was the Pennsylvania
judgment of Mrs. Dunlevy's rights.
This "discovery of property" distinction was elaborated upon by Professor
Carpenter28 in his defense of the garnishment cases against attack by Professor
Beale.29 "In the case of a debt," he says, "the relationship between creditor and
debtor has two aspects of significance for the law; one, the direct relationship
between the creditor and debtor, i.e., the right in personam which the creditor
has against the debtor, and the correlative duty of the debtor to the creditor
as it relates to third persons as a property right. The debt is an asset of the
creditor in the same way in which any tangible property he owns is an asset.:"0
It is true that a debt has some characteristics in common with tangible pro-
perty insofar as the creditor's rights in relation to third persons are concerned31
but an action in rem is an altogether different matter since there the question is
whether the state has sufficient contact with the res as to lend efficacy to its judg-
ment and not infringe upon the sovereignty of another state.32 Simply to denomin-
ate a debt "property" would not seem to convert it from an intangible personal
relationship, to a thing of such substance that one state can control it to the ex-
clusion of all others.
Perhaps the argument might have been more palatable if garnishment had
been restricted to the place where the debt was payable and where the debtor was
domiciled, since there would be at least some element of consent or reciprocal ob-
ligation in the same sense that the power of the state to proceed againset property
27 Id. at 520.
28. Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration,
Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 HPARv. L. REv. 905 (1918).
29. Beale, Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 107 (1913).
30. Carpenter, supra note 28, at 912.
31. Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 38 1915).
32. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S 714, 727 (1877).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
is sometimes said to adhere because the owner accepts the privilege granted by
the state to utilize its protection in respect to the property.33 But w~hether the
requirement of section 286, that the debt be payable within New York State,
will be found sufficient to overcome, or obscure, the primary distinction drawn in
the Dunlevy case, that is, that in interpleader the rights of the litigants are passed
on directly, is too speculative to venture. It would seem, since in that case money
was paid into court, that it will be necessary for the courts to meet the Dunlevy
decision head on in dealing with section 286.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court cited by the Judicial Council3 4
4s indicating a liberal trend in the modern application of the in rem concept deal
with other aspects of the judicial treatment of debts. The first of these concerns
the problem of the transfer of an obligation from an open account with the debtor
to the state under a statute giving protective custody of the obligation to the
state, or one escheating the account to the state. The latter differs from the former
only in that, the obligation having been transferred to the state, it is then term-
inated by exercise of sovereign power; the account having been abandoned for
a sufficient length of time to be deemed abandoned by the owner, the money
is then held for the benefit of the whole community.3 5 In Standard Oil Company
v. New Jersey,36 cited by the Judicial Council, the state, pursuant to statute, de-
clared escheated dividends on shares which the state declared presumably aban-
doned, a reasonable length of time having passed since the declaration. Standard
Oil had issued the stock and held the dividends in other states, keeping only its
stock and transfer books within New Jersey. The Court held that the state, having
sufficient power of coercion over the company, had control over the obligation.
While this case is actually a step further than those cases relied upon in the
opinion in which the debtors had held funds within the state,3 the basic rationale
is still intact: The obligation is transferred to the state and subsequently *or
simultaneously the state may terminate all rights against it.38
Shading off from this line of cases are those where the state is deemed to have
such an interest in the disposition of the obligation as to outweigh individual
33. Ibid.
34. TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT, OP. cit. supra note 8 at 283.
35. In re Melrose Ave., 234 N.Y. 48, 136 N.E. 235 (1922).
36. 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
37. Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1943); Security
Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
38. In Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948), the
Court held that the state may escheat claims where the owners of the claims
were residents of the state when they matured. The Standard Oil case, since It
allows the state of domicile of the corporation-debtor also to escheat, would seem
to lead to a "race of diligence" between the various stites having contacts with
the transaction to attach the debt. However constitutional due process will
prevent a too unseemly haste in declaring the debt abandoned. See Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1897); Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233
(1943).
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rights. Among these is the case of Mullane v. Ceontral Hanover Bank," the second
case relied upon by the Judicial council. There section 100-c of the New York
Banking Law, which provides for the pooling of small trusts into single large
trusts, was challenged. Nonresident beneficiaries stood to be affected by the pool-
ing arrangement since they lost their right to have the original trustee answer
for impairment of their interest and their interest was subject to some diminu-
tion in the proceedings, therefore it was necessary that they be made parties to
the consolidation proceedings and this was done by service by publication. The
Supreme Court, while reversing on the grounds that publication was not sufficient
where more realistic notice was available to nonresidents of known addresses,
upheld the jurisdiction of the state upon reasonable notice to nonresidents on
the grounds that the interest of the state in preventing small trusts from becoming
depleted by rising administrative costs outweighed the effect on individual non-
residents. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, also analogized the power
granted in section 100-c to the power of the state to discharge trustees, said to be
"rooted in custom. '40 But in the instance where the corpus of the trust may be
affected, at least two jurisdictions have held that the residence of the trustee alone
within the state would not grant them jurisdiction,41 and several others have con-
sidered personal jurisdiction over the beneficiary the determinative factor,42 so
that this custom does not seem analogous to the problem at hand. Nevertheless,
the principal grounds for the decision add little to the present discussion since
no direct determination as to the beneficial ownership of the obligations of the
trustees was necessary. The duty of the trustee was simply transferred, not the
ownership of the beneficiary.
The leading case in New York on interstate interpleader is Hanna v.
Stedman,4 3 wherein the Court of Appeals refused to recognize the jurisdiction of
its own court when a nonresident had been interpleaded by publication in a suit
to determine the ownership of proceeds of an insurance fund. The decision was,
of course, founded on the in personam nature of the relationship between the
insurance organization and the potential beneficiary, but the money had not been
paid into court and the statement by the majority that this would not alter the
decision, remains as dictum. Nevertheless payment into court has been held by
the United States Supreme Court to be not sufficient to grant jurisdiction over a
39. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
40. Id. at 313.
41. Schuster v. Sdiperior Court, 98 Cal. App. 619, 277 Pac. 509 (1929); Swartz
v. Gerhardt, 44 Ore. 425, 75 Pac. 698 (1904); contra, Brannan v. Brannan, 236
App. Div. 164, 258 N.Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dep't 1932).
42. Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891); Paget v. Stevens, 143 N.Y.
172, 38 N.E. 273 (1894); Dittmar v. Gould, 60 App. Div. 94, 69 N.Y. Supp. 708(1st Dep't 1901); Coyne v. Plume, 90 Conn. 293, 97 Atl. 337 (1916); People v.
Surrogate's Court, 229 N.Y. 495, 128 N.E. 890 (1920); Garland v. Higgins, 160
Tenn. 381, 25 S.W.2d 583 (1930); Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 Mass. 457,
13 N.E.2d 299 (1938).
43. 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921).
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nonresiden0 4 The Hania case, plus dictum, has been generally followed and
concurred in 45
A recent development in New York which may influence the future of
section 286 concerns surrogate's practice. Sections 205 and 206 of the Surrogate's
Court Act provides that upon facts tending to show that "money or other personal
property" is in the possession of a person who withholds the same, the Surrogate
may order an inquiry to determine conflicting claims and direct delivery-of the
money or property to-the successful claimant. As the Court of Appeals said in
In're Trevor's Estate"
The legislature has not vested in the Surrogate's Court jurisdiction
'over actions at jaw for the recovery of common debts or to enforce ordi,
nary contract obligations and ... an action to establish and enforce a
debt must be. brought in the common law forums. The nature of such an
action is in persoham and it does not come within the purview of th*
statute authorizing in rem discovery proceedings. The relationship
between a bankand its depositor is that of debtor and creditor with the
*result that the, obligation of the bank to the depositor remains merely
a chose in action inm possession of the depositor. (emphasis added).
-Soon after this decision, the legisiature, amended section 205 specifically to
include bank accounts within the term "money or personal property.147 The effect
of such a statute upon the otherwise personal nature of the depositor-bank rela-
tionship must remain a mystery for the time being, no less so in view of the
holding in In re Balthazar's Estate48 that the new amendment did not weaken the
rule that discovery does not lie to recover on debts or contract claims.
The quick response of.the legislature to the Trevor case may be interpreted
44. Bank'-of J'asper'v. 'First National-Bank, 258 U.S. 112 (1922).
45. Schoenholz vs New York Life Ins. Co., 197 App. Dlv. 91, 188 N.Y. Supp.
596 (1st Dep't 1921), aff 'd, 234 N.Y. 24, 136 N.E. 27 (1922); Redzina v. Provident
Institution of Savings, 96 N.J. Eq. 346, 125 Aft. 133 (1924); Gallagher v. Rogan,
322 Pa. 315, 185 At. 707 (1936); contra, St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. v. Meyer,
364 Mo. 1057, 272 S.W.2d 249 (1954), criticized in Note, 9 OKLA. L. Rav. 194
(1956).
The law review writers are also generally in accord: "There is money within
the court's control, but that money is not the debt unless the creditor consents
or he can be personally ordered by the court to accept the substituted situatioir
and release the debtor," Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L. J. 711 (1924);
"This would be carrying reification a bit too far," Andrews, Situs of Intangibles
in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L. J. 241, 261 (1939); 1. .. it
would not seem to be due process to permit a plaintiff to terminate obligations in
what is in substance an ex parte action .... The plaintiff shouldn't be allowed to
garnish himself," Fraser, Actions in lem, 34 CORN. L. Q. 29 (1948).
46. 309 N.Y. 389, 393, 131 N.E.2d 561, 563 (1955).
47. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 270.
48. 4 Misc.2d 800, 156 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Surr. Ct. 1956), holding that discovery
under section 205 does not include insurance proceeds.
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as a recognition of the need within the state of settling small claims against
banks49 and insurance companies practicably, quickly and inexpensively. This is
also the function proposed to be fulfilled by section 286. Nevertheless both statutes
efect a radical change in present decisional law. Obligation and right are not
separate entities but different aspects of the same relationship. It may be that
when a debt is upon a specialty, the acknowledgment of the parties, and the
custom of business, will not allow a creditor to deny that it operates as the embodi-
ment of the obligation so as to facilitate transfer and allow an in rem judgment
upon it;50 but in the absence of such an instrument there is usually no such consent
or custom in regard to a debt.5
This is not to say that there may not be ways to circumvent the general
weight of present law. It has been suggested that the garnishment and interpleader
cases can be reconciled upon the theory that an interpleader decree, being of
equitable cognizance, operates only upon the person.52 The action now being made
statutorily in rem, the action is no longer inhibited by its equitable origins, and
iniy be entitled to out-of-state recognition under ordinary conflict of laws prin-
ciples. However, the essential fact of the transaction, the personal relationship of
debtor and creditor, is entirely overlooked by this argument.
It may also be contended that since the debt, under the requirements of the
statute, must be payable within the state, and the debtor must be a domiciliary,
the parties by their own consent have fixed the forum and given as much power
over the transaction to the state as the state could have over any in rem action. 3
In addition the state may be said to have found it to be in the general public
interest to expedite such multiple claims, thereby adding up enough jurisdictional
fact within the state to entitle such a judgment relating to the ownership of the
49. Section 286 received strong support from a committee of lawyers repre-
senting New York Banks. TWENTETE ANNUAL REPORT OF N.Y. JuDraCAL COUNCrL,
1954, p. 284.
50. Loaiza v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. 11, 24 Pac. 707 (1890); Manning v.
Berdan, 132 Fed. 382 (C.C.D.N. J. 1904).51. Cases involving attorney's liens are sometimes 
-cited for the proposition
that an in rem action is allowed on a debt. E.g., Bank. of Jasper v. First National
Bank, 258 U.S. 112 (1922); Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Non-
resident Claimants, 49 YALE L. J. 241, 258 (1939), both .citing Oishei v. Pennsyl-
vania R.., 117 App. Div. 110, 102 N.Y.Supp. 368 (1st Dep't 1907), aif'd mem., 191
N.Y. 544, 85 N.E. 1113 (1908). These cases involve the problem of a settlement of
a suit by the defendant directly with the plaintiff who then leaves the jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's attorney is then allowed to enforce his lien against the defendant by
serving the absent plaintiff by publication, since the defendant is presumed to
have retained in his actual possession enough of the settlement fund to satisfy
the lien and this constitutes the res. See McKennell v. Payne, 197 App. Div. 340,
189 N.Y. Supp. 7 (2d Dep't 1921); In re Levine's Estate, 154 Misc. 700 278 N.Y.
Supp. 37 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Smith v. Young, 268 App. Div, 802, 49 N.Y.S.2d 572(2d Dep't 1944); Morgan v. Drewry, 124 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
52. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 109 (2d ed. 1951).
53. See note 25 supra on the former New York position in respect to the
requirement of domicile in garnishment.
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debt to credit elsewhere.54 This view would seem to be supported by language in
the recent Supreme Court case of McGee v. International Life Insurance Com-
pany.55 There an insurance company having no connection with California other
than by a single insurance policy was held amenable to service of process by
registered mail in Texas in a suit brought on the policy in California. Mr. Justice
Black, speaking for a unanimous Court, said:5 6
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a
contract which had substantial connection with that State.... It cannot
be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.
These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to
follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally
accountable.
This decision, of course, like International Shoe Company v. Washington,7
concerns a state's power over foreign corporations. The Court has, in the past,
held that the mere transaction of business in a state by nonresident natural persons
does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts.58 However the
implication is present that the traditional concept that political boundaries are not
coincidental with economic boundaries is considerably weakened.
Nevertheless there as yet seems no clear indication that the courts will align
interpleader with the interstate garnishment doctrine. The state, by the nature of
a debt, may not acquire such contact with it in an interpleader action against a
nonresident either to entitle the judgment to full faith and credit in another
state, or to deprfire the nonresident creditor of the right to later assert his claim
in this state. "The nature of such a case is one of jurisdictional facts,"5" and it
would seem that New York, by section 286 is not attempting a change in the law,
but rather the facts of the transaction.60
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